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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the within-model-year pricing and production of new automobiles. Using new
monthly data on U.S. transaction prices, we document that for the typical new vehicle, prices fall
over the model year at a 9.2 percent annual rate. Concurrently, both sales and inventories are hump
shaped. To explain these time series, we formulate a market equilibrium model for new automobiles
in which inventory and pricing decisions are made simultaneously. On the demand side, we use
micro-level data to estimate time-varying aggregate demand curves for each vehicle. On the supply
side, we solve a dynamic programming model of an automaker that, while able to produce only one
vintage of a product at a time, may accumulate inventories and consequently sell multiple vintages
of the same product simultaneously. The profit maximizing pricing and production strategies under
a build-to-stock inventory policy imply declining prices and hump-shaped sales and inventories of
the magnitudes observed in the data. Further, roughly half of the price decline is driven by inventory
control considerations, as opposed to decreasing demand.
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george.hall@yale.eduTwo common features of durable goods markets are high levels of inventories relative to sales and
declining prices over the product cycle. The optimal pricing strategy and inventory management of a
good over its product cycle are classic issues in the industrial organization, revenue management, and
inventory literatures. However much of the work explicitly linking pricing and inventories policies has
beentheoretical, whilemuchoftheempiricalliteraturehasstudiedeitherinventoriesorpricinginisolation.
In this paper we jointly consider the optimal pricing, production, and inventory management policies for a
durable goods producer and quantify empirically the role inventory control has on the time path of prices
within the product cycle.
We accomplish this by analyzing the pricing and production decisions of an automaker over the model
year, taking into account both the annual introduction of new vintages and the need to maintain sufﬁcient
inventories to facilitate sales. We ﬁrst document, by vintage, the within-model-year inventory, sales, and
pricing behavior in the U.S. market for new automobiles. We then formulate a market equilibrium model
for new automobiles. We estimate “typical” within-model-year demand curves for each market segment
and vintage and solve a dynamic programming model of the ﬁrm with overlapping vintages. The dynamic
production and pricing rules implied by the model incorporate not only the sales life cycle of each vintage
but also the competition across vintages in the new-vehicle market. We ﬁnd that the interaction between
inventory and pricing policies are key to matching the magnitude of both the observed price declines and
the ratio of inventory to sales.
Our data on prices, production, and sales of automobiles over the product cycle are the result of merg-
ing two datasets. We match new model-level monthly data on U.S. transaction prices with well-known data
on production and sales. These new price data are of unusually high quality for the automobile industry
because they not only record the actual transaction price (not the list or invoice price) but also take into
account rebates and ﬁnancing incentives the customer received. Using these data, we document ﬁve facts:
1. For the typical new vehicle, the average monthly decline in retail prices (net of rebates and incen-
tives) is 9.2 percent at an annual rate.
2. Althoughnewvintagesofavehicleareintroducedannually, theaveragevintageissoldfor16.7months.
Thus, for nearly half of each calendar year, two vintages of each model are sold simultaneously.
3. When two model years of the same make are selling simultaneously, the old vintage sells for a price
8.8 percent less, on average, than the price of the new vintage.
24. Both sales and inventories are hump shaped over the model year, where the mean ratio of inventories
to sales is 76 days.
5. All other things being constant, higher inventories are associated with lower retail prices.
Facts 1 through 3 describe the price path of a typical model within and across model years. Price
declines over the product cycle and the simultaneous sale of multiple vintages of the same product are
not unique to the automobile industry, having been documented for a number of other products, including
textbooks, microprocessors, and consumer electronics. The sale of several vintages of the same good is
a potentially important dimension to the ﬁrm’s problem, because the within new-market competition is in
addition to, and potentially more important than, competition from the used market. New goods of an older
vintage are usually quite similar to those of the newer vintage, and they do not suffer from the asymmetric
information problems inherent in the used good market. Most existing theories that seek to explain the
price paths described by facts 1 through 3 focus on intertemporal price discrimination (e.g. Stokey, 1979)
or fashion (e.g. Lazear, 1986; Pashigian, 1988; and Pesendorfer, 1995). These theories, however, place
little emphasis on the ﬁrm’s production decisions. Perhaps not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that with regard to
the market for new automobiles, these theories alone cannot explain the contemporaneous comovements
in prices, sales, and inventories over the product cycle.
The last two stylized facts regarding sales and inventories are well known within the automobile in-
dustry. Automakers carry an extraordinary amount of inventory relative to sales, as lots at dealerships
are kept fully stocked with vehicles. In combination with declining prices over the product cycle, these
facts suggest that a model with either stable demand or stable supply will be unable to replicate the ﬁrst
three facts. During the ﬁrst six months a vehicle is sold, prices are high but declining, quantities sold are
low but rising, and inventories accumulate. This pattern suggests that rightward shifts in the supply curve
dominate changes in the demand curve early in the model year. During the last twelve months the vehicle
is sold, however, both prices and sales fall, an indication that leftward shifts in the demand curve now play
the major role.
To reﬁne this intuition, we formulate a market equilibrium model for new cars that links the opera-
tions research literature on optimal inventory and revenue management with the economics literature on
discrete-choice models of product differentiation. In particular, we solve a dynamic structural model with
overlapping vintages in which an automaker can adjust both the price and the quantity produced within the
model year. The automaker sells a vehicle that is slightly modiﬁed, or changes vintage, every year. While
3the automaker produces only the current vintage, the use of inventories allows the ﬁrm to sell more than
one vintage of the product simultaneously. Each week, the ﬁrm must decide the number of units of the
current vintage to produce and the optimal prices for the vintages in stock.
Eachweektheﬁrmfacesadifferentdownwardslopingdemandcurveforeachvintage. Wederivethese
demand curves from estimates of consumer preferences for automobiles by employing the econometric
methodology developed in the discrete-choice literature (for example, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995;
Goldberg, 1995; and Petrin, 2002; to name a few). Our approach differs from this standard approach in
three main ways. First, we have a better measure of prices, as we use transaction prices instead of the usual
list prices. Second, we estimate our demand-side model at a quarterly, rather than an annual, frequency;
thus, we estimate how the demand curve shifts throughout the model year. Third, we allow consumers to
chooseamongmultiplevintageswithinandacrossmodels. Usingourestimatesofconsumers’preferences,
we compute average demand curves for each automobile market segment (such as compact cars) and
vintage over the automobile product cycle. An advantage of our approach is that we allow households
to differ across quarters in their distaste for price, hence our model accommodates, at least in part, the
possibility of the ﬁrm engaging in intertemporal price discrimination.
A main result from the demand side analysis is that demand curves for most vehicles shift signiﬁcantly
leftward over the second half of the model year, and the slopes of the curves undergo small changes.
Further, we estimate that cross-price elasticities between models of different vintages are quite small.
Hence, despite the similarities between vintages of the same model, consumers view vehicles from one
model year as poor substitutes for vehicles in another model year. These estimates play a central role in the
ﬁrm’s problem, as they directly affect the ﬁrm’s revenue ﬂows from selling multiple vintages of the same
model at the same time. Lastly, we ﬁnd that households are slightly more price sensitive during periods
of the year when manufacturers typically offer two vintages of a model for sale, relative to those quarters
where only one model year is usually available.
Taking the demand curves as given, the ﬁrm solves a dynamic inventory problem to maximize proﬁts.
The joint production/pricing decision we model is a classic issue in the operations research literature going
back to Whiten (1955) and Karlin and Carr (1962).1 Like many papers in this literature, we assume that the
good must be sold by a ﬁxed deadline, but we extend the theory by allowing the ﬁrm to sell two vintages
simultaneously and to have a cost structure of producing vehicles with several nontrivial nonconvexities.
1Federgruen and Heching (1999) and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) provide a nice overview of the more recent rev-
enue management literature within operations research. Also see Chan, Hall, and Rust (2005) for an analysis of a similar pric-
ing/procurement decision.
4A signiﬁcant aspect of the automotive market that we reﬂect in our model is the distribution of deal-
erships across the geographic market. Showrooms are instrumental in allowing consumers to learn about
manufacturers’ products and to gauge products’ characteristics. In this industry, for example, consumers
value the ability to observe the vehicle they are considering purchasing and to take possession of the ve-
hicle without delay. Consequently, part of the automaker’s problem is ensuring that there are a sufﬁcient
level of inventories on dealer lots across the national market. The automotive trade press often mentions
the necessity of a showroom presence when discussing manufacturers’ inventories. In a recent issue of
Ward’s Automotive Reports (August 2, 2004), a Cadillac executive stated, “We have 1,000 dealers who
sell less than 50 vehicles a year. They’re holding 300 to 400 days’ supply [that is, inventories over sales]
because they want to display all the models.” We incorporate this need to build-to-stock (that is, invento-
ries are a prerequisite for sales) into the model by assuming that the ﬁrm faces a “revenue tax” that is a
function of sales over inventory. We assume that increases in the sales-to-inventory ratio make it harder
for the ﬁrm to consummate sales by raising the tax the ﬁrm pays per transaction.
After calibrating the supply-side parameters of the model, we are able to replicate the decline in prices
over the model year along with hump-shaped sales and inventories that we observe in the data. Early in the
model year, the automaker sets the vehicle price high to dampen sales and thus accumulate a large stock
of inventories. Building up inventories, or following a build-to-stock inventory management strategy, is
optimal because it reduces the cost of carrying out a transaction (that is, it lowers the revenue tax). Over
the remainder of the model year, our estimate of leftward-shifting demand lowers the shadow value of
inventories, resulting in a 8.1 percent decline in the retail price of a vehicle over the entire product cycle
and an average vintage premium of 7.9 percent.
We then solve the model with no revenue tax, thus allowing the ﬁrm to manage inventories on a build-
to-orderbasis. Inthiscase, retailpricesfallovertheproductcyclebutbyonlyone-halfofthemagnitudewe
see in the data. Hence, unlike previous work that attributes falling prices to fashion or price discrimination,
our theory implies that build-to-stock inventory management is as important in driving price decline as
these other forces. Further, under a build-to-order policy the paths of sales and inventories do not feature
the prominent hump-shaped patterns seen in the data. These results demonstrate the signiﬁcance of the
ﬁrm’s inventory strategy on the optimal pricing path. Falling demand alone explains about half of the price
decline in automobiles and misses signiﬁcant comovements among prices, sales and inventories.
51 Data Sources and Empirical Observations
In this section, we outline the sources of the data used in our analysis and document several stylized facts.
1.1 Data Sources
To construct a dataset with information on prices, sales, production, and inventories by model and model
year in the U.S., we combined data from two sources. The ﬁrst data source includes detailed information
on U.S. retail transactions collected from a sample of vehicle dealerships. It provides information on
prices, by model and model year, and on the distribution of sales, also by model and model year. The
second data source contains information on total sales in North America, by country and model, and on
production, by model and model year.
The ﬁrst dataset was constructed by Corrado, Dunn, and Otoo (2004), who obtained the data from J.D.
Power and Associates (JDPA). JDPA collects daily transaction-level information from dealerships across
the U.S., which it aggregates to a monthly frequency. Then, along the product space dimension, JDPA
adds up the data to a model and model-year level. The sample of transactions we use represents 70 percent
of the geographical markets in the U.S. and roughly 15 to 20 percent of national retail transactions. It
contains monthly observations for almost all unique make, model, and model-year light motor vehicles
(for example, 2000 Ford Escort) sold in the U.S. and covers the period from January 1999 to January
2004. Among other variables, the dataset includes information on the number of transactions recorded,
the average transaction price, the average cash rebate, and details about the average ﬁnancial package
customers received. JDPA attempts to precisely measure the transaction price of a vehicle. This measure
includes the price of accessories (such as roof racks) and transportation costs but excludes aftermarket
options, taxes, title fees, and other documentary preparation costs. Further, JDPA adjusts this price to
account for instances when a dealership undervalues or overvalues a customer’s trade-in vehicle as part of
a new vehicle sale. JDPA’s transaction price does not account for incentives the customer received to help
ﬁnance the purchase of the car; hence, we deﬁne the average market price of a vehicle as the transaction
price minus the cash rebate minus a measure of the ﬁnancial incentive offered by the manufacturer.
In the data, we observe the amount ﬁnanced, interest rate, and loan term that the average customer
received. The ﬁnancial data are captured for loans that customers obtained from any ﬁnancial institution,
as long as the ﬁnancing was arranged through the dealership. As a majority of car loans arranged through
dealerships are made by the ﬁnancing arms of manufacturers, we treat the ﬁnancial data as an approxima-
6tion of the average ﬁnancial package that consumers received from manufacturers. To measure the value of
these ﬁnancial incentives to consumers, we compare the ﬁnancial package in the data against a benchmark
package offered by commercial banks. We make this comparison by ﬁrst computing the net present value
(NPV) of the average amount ﬁnanced given the interest rate and loan term in the data. We then compute
the NPV of ﬁnancing the same average amount at the average interest rate reported for 48-month new car
loans at commercial banks.2 The value of the manufacturer’s ﬁnancial incentive is then deﬁned as the
difference between the two NPV amounts. Finally, we convert the market price into 2000 dollars by using
the BEA’s personal consumption deﬂator.
As stated earlier, the data from JDPA provide the market prices of vehicles and the distribution of sales,
by model and model year. Using the total number of transactions across model years in each period, we
compute the fraction of a model’s sales that is accounted for by each available model year.
We linked the JDPA data to information on the U.S. sales and North American production of General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, which we obtained from Ward’s Communications. We excluded foreign man-
ufacturers, as measuring overseas production is difﬁcult. The sales data for these ﬁrms (also known as the
Big Three) are available only at the model level, not by model year. Therefore, we constructed estimates
of sales by model and model year on the basis of the monthly model-year distributions in the JDPA sam-
ple. Using information from Ward’s on model changeover dates at North American assembly plants, we
decomposed the production data by model into observations by model year. Finally, using the sales and
production estimates by make, model, and model year, we constructed estimates of vehicle inventories
over the sample period. All told, the work described here results in a dataset with monthly observations,
by model year, on the real average market price, quantity sold, quantity produced, and inventory held for
almost all light vehicle models sold by the Big Three in the U.S. from 1999 to 2003.
1.2 Empirical Observations
As stated earlier, by examining these data we can observe several stylized facts that hold across models and
model years. To provide illustrative examples, we show plots of the price, sales, production, and inventory
data for a midsize car and a pickup truck (ﬁgures 1-8). The steady decrease in price over the sales cycle
is immediately evident for both vehicles shown in the ﬁgures. In the 2000 model year, the average market
price for the midsize car falls over $2,000, more than 10 percent of the initial price. The declines in prices
for subsequent model years are just as pronounced. For the pickup, the price declines average a dramatic
2The Board of Governors publishes these data in its G.19 Consumer Credit release
7Market Model Year All
Segment 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Compact 7.7 5.9 8.1 9.4 17.5 9.5 (2.4)
Midsize 9.1 6.7 6.1 9.0 16.4 9.2 (1.5)
Fullsize 8.9 7.9 6.4 8.5 13.4 8.9 (2.1)
Luxury 11.6 10.3 8.8 13.1 14.9 11.6 (1.2)
Pickup 6.6 10.0 7.1 9.2 15.4 9.9 (2.2)
SUV 7.0 6.7 7.2 5.2 13.6 8.2 (0.9)
Sporty 2.3 6.2 0.4 6.1 10.9 5.1 (2.4)
Vans 5.4 9.0 9.3 8.5 15.7 9.6 (1.4)
Total 7.4 8.0 7.1 8.1 15.1 9.2 (0.6)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis
Table 1: The Average Monthly Price Decline (annual rate) by Market Segment and Model Year
$4,000 for the 2001 through 2003 model years. Both the midsize car and the pickup clearly exhibit the
simultaneous sale of multiple vintages as well as the premium the newer model-year vehicle commands
over the older model-year vehicle. We refer to this difference in price as the “new vintage premium.” The
size of this premium varies, but the average premium for the midsize car is almost 7 percent, while the
premium for the pickup averages about 9 percent. Turning to the ﬁgures on sales and inventories, we ﬁnd
that the sales and inventories of both the midsize car and the pickup exhibit a hump-shaped proﬁle.
Table 1 provides a summary of the average monthly price decline, the ﬁrst stylized fact, by market
segmentandmodelyearandweightedbysales. Forthemidsizemarketsegment, themeanmonthlydecline
in prices of 1999 model-year vehicles is 9.1 percent at an annual rate. On average, midsize automobiles
fall 9.2 percent. Table 1 illustrates the wide range in average price declines both across market segments
and model years. In general, luxury vehicles decline the most in price, followed by pickup trucks. Looking
across model years, 2003 vehicles decline the most in price by far. This reﬂects especially high incentives
offered by manufacturers in the latter half of the product cycle. Overall, the monthly decline in price
averages 9.2 percent at an annual rate.
To observe the within-year price declines more generally, we illustrate the aggregate matched-model
price indexes for successive model years as constructed by Corrado, Dunn, and Otoo (2004) (ﬁgure 9).
This price index was constructed from the entire JDPA dataset and so includes price data on vehicles
produced by European and Asian automakers. As can be seen, transaction prices for a given model year
are at their highest levels when each model is introduced, and they trend downward in a consistent pattern
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Figure 2: Monthly Sales.
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Figure 4: Monthly Inventories.
Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories for a Midsize Car by Model Year




















2000 model year →
← 2001 model year
← 2002 model year
























































2000 model year →
































Figure 6: Monthly Sales.
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Figure 8: Monthly Inventories.
Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories for a Pickup Truck by Model Year























Figure 9: Matched-Model Price Indexes by Model Year.
second stylized fact–that multiple vintages of vehicles are simultaneously sold for a signiﬁcant portion
of the model year. In our database of transactions, the mean length of time a vehicle is on the market is
16.7 months. The number of months sold varies little across vehicles; the mean length of the automobile
product cycle has a standard error of only 0.02.
Turning to the third stylized fact, we report the average new vintage premium by market segment and
model year, weighted by sales (table 2). The table illustrates that the new vintage premium of 2000 model-
year midsize cars over their 1999 model-year counterparts is 10.0 percent. In the sample, the new vintage
premium is 8.5 percent, on average, for midsize cars, and the standard error is 0.4.
Although the new vintage premium varies quite a bit across market segments and time, overall it
amounts to 8.8 percent, on average, in our sample. This premium is highest for luxury cars and pickup
trucksandlowestforcompactcars, sportutilityvehicles, andsportycars, wherethedifferenceinpremiums
between luxury and compacts is 4.5 percent. Across model years, the average new vintage premium
is typically between 7 and 9 percent, though the premium during the 2003 to 2004 changeover is 13.1
percent. This large premium is related to the steep decline in within model-year prices for 2003 model-
year vehicles, shown in table 1. Both numbers reﬂect the unusually high incentives the Big Three placed
on 2003 model-year vehicles over the second half of the product cycle.
One might argue that the new vintage premium simply reﬂects improvements in quality or additional
11Market Model Year All
Segment 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Compact 5.9 6.9 6.7 6.9 11.0 7.1 (0.5)
Midsize 10.0 5.8 6.1 7.5 11.9 8.5 (0.4)
Fullsize 9.9 6.2 7.8 8.2 9.2 8.3 (0.6)
Luxury 11.0 11.6 9.8 14.1 11.1 11.6 (0.4)
Pickup 10.7 9.8 6.3 8.6 20.0 10.6 (0.7)
SUV 5.4 0.4 10.1 8.8 10.9 7.2 (0.4)
Sporty 2.6 7.5 3.3 28.9 -7.8 7.2 (0.8)
Van 7.7 11.8 3.6 9.1 12.4 8.6 (0.4)
All 8.6 7.2 7.1 9.1 13.1 8.8 (0.2)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis
Table 2: The Average ‘New Vintage Premium’ by Market Segment and Model Year
features. For example, the 20 percent new vintage premium recorded for 2004 model-year pickup trucks
reﬂects, in part, a quality improvement made to Ford’s F-series pickup truck.3 For many of the vehicles
in our sample, however, changes in the observable characteristics from one model year to the next were
minimal, and even for vehicles with such changes, the downward-sloping price pattern was still apparent.
To further investigate this fact, we looked at the new vintage premium for a subsample of vehicles that
had not undergone a major redesign. We determined when a model received a major redesign by using
data from Ward’s Communications on the vehicle’s platform. Given that the platform choice designates
the basic structure of the vehicle, we take a manufacturer’s decision to change a vehicle’s platform as a
sufﬁcient, thoughnotnecessary, conditionthatthevehiclehasundergoneamajorredesign. Werecomputed
the new vintage premium for these vehicles and found that the average premium differs little from the
ﬁgures reported in table 2.
The fourth stylized fact states that both sales and inventories for a particular model and model year
exhibit a humped-shaped pattern. When we plot the Big Three’s aggregate sales by model year, we see the
distinctive hump shape that sales follow over the product cycle (ﬁgure 10). The contour of aggregate sales,
however, confounds the evolution of sales over the product cycle with calender effects, because vehicles of
a given model year are not all introduced in the same month. To separate out these two effects, we deﬁne
the dummy variables 1t for t = 1;2;:::;14 as indicators of how many months the model year has been
sold. If 1t=1 is equal to 1, then at this date the associated vehicle is in its ﬁrst month of sales. For model
3Alternatively, if a cheaper base model is introduced, the vehicle premium may be biased downwards (see, for example, the
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Figure 10: Big Three Sales by Model Year
years that are sold for more than fourteen months, we deﬁne a dummy variable 115+, which is equal to 1
for sales that take place more than fourteen months after the introduction of the vehicle to the marketplace.
We then run a regression of log sales on these dummy variables, including ﬁxed effects for each model and
controlling for the calender month. Examining the coefﬁcients on these dummy variables then provides
an estimate of the shape of the typical sales path for a vehicle. Using a similar approach, but substituting
inventories for sales, we can also study the shape of the typical inventory path for a vehicle. We report the
estimated coefﬁcients from running these two regressions (table 3).
Regarding the sales regression, the estimated coefﬁcients imply that sales do indeed follow a humped-
shaped path. After rapid sales growth in the ﬁrst three selling months, the level of sales then slowly climbs
to its peak six to eight months after the vehicle’s debut before declining. This same pattern can be seen
in the estimated coefﬁcients from the regression using inventories. Inventories peak slightly later, roughly
nine months after a vehicle’s debut, before rapidly falling.
To better analyze the relationship between sales and inventories, we consider the ratio of inventories
to sales, also known as days’ supply. We use the stock of inventories at the beginning of the period and
sales for the current month. Hence, this ratio measures the number of days the ﬁrm could continue to
sell cars if it used only the stock of inventories available at the start of the month, assuming future sales
are equal to the current month’s ﬂow. A major focus of the days’ supply calculation is the large stock of
13Sales Inventories
Parameter Coefﬁcient Standard Error Coefﬁcient Standard Error
1t=2 0.76 0.038 0.32 0.058
1t=3 1.09 0.039 0.50 0.060
1t=4 1.24 0.039 0.62 0.061
1t=5 1.24 0.039 0.79 0.061
1t=6 1.25 0.040 0.94 0.062
1t=7 1.26 0.041 1.03 0.066
1t=8 1.25 0.041 1.05 0.067
1t=9 1.18 0.041 1.11 0.068
1t=10 0.98 0.042 1.09 0.067
1t=11 0.93 0.042 0.84 0.066
1t=12 0.95 0.042 0.38 0.064
1t=13 0.82 0.041 -0.07 0.063
1t=14 0.60 0.043 -0.45 0.066
1t=15+ -0.11 0.034 -0.80 0.047
Table 3: The Shape of Sales and Inventories by Model and Model Year Over the Product Cycle
Market Segment Compact Midsize Fullsize Luxury Pickup SUV Sporty Vans All
Days Supply 73 60 75 80 84 75 83 85 76 (2.1)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis
Table 4: The Average Days Supply by Market Segment
inventories that automakers carry relative to sales. On average, automakers carry 76 days’ supply in our
data–implying automakers typically carry enough inventories to sell vehicles for over two months without
any additional production. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the average days supply by market segment
and illustrates the substantial variation in days supply across different types of vehicles.
Turning to the last stylized fact, we look at the correlation between inventories and prices, by model
and model year. To analyze the relationship between prices and moments when inventories are above
or below trend, we ﬁrst need to accurately measure when inventories are ample or lean. The residuals
from the inventory regression described earlier provide a measure of the deviations from the usual contour
of inventories over the product cycle. We measure whether prices are correlated with these inventory
ﬂuctuations by regressing the log of price on a lag of these inventory residuals. We ﬁnd the expected
signiﬁcant negative relationship between lagged inventory residuals and price: The estimated coefﬁcient
on the lagged residuals is -0.02, and the associated standard error is 0.003.
The decline in an automobile’s price over the model year and the resulting new vintage premium has
14been studied by Pashigian, Bowen, and Gould (1995). They hypothesize that the new vintage premium
reﬂects optimal pricing behavior in an environment in which demand is driven by fashion. They use
monthly data from the consumer price index to show that at the aggregate level prices for new cars decline
between December and September of the model year. Although the magnitude of the within-model-year
price declines have fallen between 1954 and 1989, Pashigian, Bowen, and Gould ﬁnd these price declines
are larger for luxury and speciality cars than for compacts and subcompacts. They argue that the larger
the changes in styling and quality improvements between model years, the larger the within-model-year
price declines. Hence, the new-car market behaves like the market for fashionable apparel. In contrast, we
ﬁnd only marginal evidence of a particular pattern in the new vintage premium across market segments.
As shown in table 2, although luxury cars command the highest vintage premium, other fashion-oriented
vehicle types such as SUVs and sporty automobiles command premiums nearly equal to, or markedly
below, those of the more plain compact and midsize automobiles.
Given the evidence, we posit that within-model-year price declines are driven more by the used-vehicle
market than by fashion. Consider the case of a 2000 model-year vehicle produced at the end of the product
cycle and a 2001 model-year vehicle produced at the beginning of the product cycle. Although these two
vehicles may have been produced just a few weeks apart, we expect that in the used-vehicle market, the
2000 vintage will be perceived to have been on the road twelve months longer than the 2001 vintage.
To provide evidence in support of this hypothesis, we estimated a price regression on a separate JDPA
dataset of used-vehicle transactions from 2001-2003. The left-hand-side variable is the log of the trans-
action price for a given model and vintage of a used vehicle. The explanatory variables in the regression
include time and model dummies as well as vehicle characteristics such as engine size. As a proxy for
the vehicle’s physical depreciation, we include the vehicle’s odometer reading when sold. Finally, we also
add a measure of the vehicle’s model age, which equals the calendar year minus the model year plus one.4
We show the resulting coefﬁcients on age and odometer reading, both of which are statistically signiﬁcant
with greater than 99 percent conﬁdence (table 5). As expected, the coefﬁcient on the odometer reading
is negative and implies a price decline of about 0.4 percent for each additional 1,000 miles on a given
vehicle. Notably, the coefﬁcient on age implies that, even after controlling for the odometer reading and
other vehicle characteristics, a higher model age (that is, an older model year) implies a lower price in the
used vehicle market. All other things constant, increasing the age (as deﬁned by the model year) by one
4Because we have a limited set of physical characteristics to control for changes in vehicle quality across vintages of the same
model, we restrict the sample to vehicles of age four or under. This restriction reduces the variation in price across vintages of
the same model due to changes in unobserved characteristics.
15Variable Coefﬁcient Standard Error
Age -0.093 0.004
Odometer (thousands of miles) -0.004 0.000
Table 5: Coefﬁcients on Age and Odometer from the Used-vehicle Price Regression
year decreases the value of a used vehicle by 9.3 percent, a ﬁgure only slightly greater than our estimate of
the new vintage premium. This strongly suggests that the new vintage premium is driven by the difference
in the new vehicles’ values in the used-vehicle market.
2 A Market Equilibrium Model with Overlapping Model Years
In this section, we present a market equilibrium model designed to capture the empirical regularities doc-
umented earlier. We ﬁrst describe the ﬁrm’s problem. We assume the automaker takes market demand
curves as given and solves a dynamic proﬁt maximization problem. As the automaker is able to hold
inventories, at certain times the automaker is able to sell two vehicles, the current year’s vintage and the
previous year’s vintage. The ﬁrm’s model parameters are calibrated to match the key features of the ﬁrm’s
cost structure and the means of prices, output and inventories. We derive decision rules that govern the
production and pricing of vehicles over the model year. Through numerical simulations, we demonstrate
that the empirical regularities documented earlier are consistent with our derived decision rules under a
build-to-stock inventory policy.
An essential feature of the ﬁrm’s problem is the market demand curve. We posit a semi-log demand
curve whose parameters are price semi-elasticities. We then draw upon the existing demand-choice litera-
ture to estimate these semi-elasticities and their change over the product cycle.
2.1 The Automaker’s Problem
In the interest of tractability, we make several strong simplifying assumptions on the supply side. First,
we assume that each vehicle line within the ﬁrm can be considered a separate, independent subﬁrm or
proﬁt center. Hence, an automaker is modelled as a collection of dynamic programs that can be solved
independently of each other. Second, we integrate the dealership into the automaker and consider a uniﬁed
pricing decision. Third, we abstract from issues of bargaining and price discrimination by assuming that
all customers who purchase during a particular period pay the same retail price. Of course, there are many
interesting questions about how the automakers actually decentralize their operations both across products
16and between the production and marketing sides of the business. But because these issues are not central
to understanding the facts presented earlier, we defer further consideration to other papers.5
The automaker sells two products: this year’s vintage and last year’s vintage. The decision period is a
week. There are T weeks in a model year, and a new model year begins the week after the old model year
ends. So the automaker solves an inﬁnite horizon problem by repeatedly solving a T-week model-year
problem. Successive model years are linked because this year’s vintage becomes last year’s vintage at the
end of the Tth week. Each week the ﬁrm must decide (1) the number of vehicles of the current model year
to produce, qt; (2) the number of days to operate the plant, Dt, the number of shifts to run, St, and the
number of hours per shift, ht; (3) the retail price of the current vintage, pthis
t ; and (4) the retail price of last
year’s vintage, plast
t (if any are still in stock).
We assume that weekly sales, s
j
t, for each of the two vintages depend on each vintage’s own price and
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where µ
j
t is a constant term, h
j
t is the own-price semi-elasticity, and f
ji
t is the cross-price semi-elasticity.
The demand parameters may vary across the 52 weeks of the year.
Unsold vehicles can be inventoried without depreciation. Let I
j
t+1 be the stock of vintage j vehicles
that are inventoried at the end of period t and carried over into period t +1. Current production is not











Because no vehicles for the last model year are produced during the current year, inventories for last year’s





At the conclusion of the current model year, any unsold vehicles of last year’s vintage are scrapped at a





5For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) model and estimate the division of markups between automobile manufacturers
and dealers. For discussions of bargaining and price discrimination in the retail auto market see Ayres and Siegelman (1995),
Goldberg (1996), and Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2001).
17We assume the vehicle is assembled at a single plant. Each period, the ﬁrm must decide how many
vehicles of the current vintage to produce and how to organize production to minimize costs. As is typical
in most manufacturing industries, assembly plant managers increase or decrease production by altering the
workweek rather than the rate of production. The plant can operate D days a week. It can run one or two
shifts, S, each day, and both shifts are h hours long. We assume the number of employees per shift, n, and
the line speed, LS, are ﬁxed. So the ﬁrm’s production function is linear in hours:
qt = Dt £St £ht £LS: (6)
Although the production function is linear, the ﬁrm faces several important non-convexities because of
its labor contract.6 The average straight-time, day-shift wage at these plants is about $27 an hour plus
beneﬁts. Workers on the second (evening) shift receive a 5 percent premium. Any work in excess of eight
hours a day, and all Saturday work, are paid at a rate of time and a half. Employees who work fewer than
40 hours per week must be paid 85 percent of their hourly wage times the difference between 40 and the
number of hours worked. This “short week compensation” is in addition to the wages a worker receives
for the hours actually worked. If the ﬁrm chooses to not operate a plant for a week, the workers are laid
off. Laid-off workers receive 95 cents on the dollar of their 40 hour pay in unemployment compensation.
Of these 95 cents, the ﬁrm pays about 65 cents.
Given such a labor contract, if the ﬁrm decides to produce q vehicles, it must then choose how many
days to operate the plant, how many shifts to run, and how many hours to run each shift to minimize its
cost of production. Given these choices, the ﬁrm’s week t cost function is expressed as
c(Dt;St;htjqt) = gqt + (w1+I(St = 2)w2)£(Dthtn+max[0;0:85(40¡Dtht)n] (7)
+max[0;0:5Dt(ht ¡8)n]+max[0;0:5(Dt ¡5)8n])+0:65w140(2¡St)n;
where g is the per vehicle material cost, n is the number of employees per shift, and w1 and w2 are the
hourly wage rates paid to the ﬁrst-shift and second-shift workers, respectively. The ﬁrst term is the per-
vehicle cost; it incorporates all costs (such as materials, energy, transaction) that do not depend on the
allocation of production over the week. The ﬁrst term within the brackets represents the straight-time
wages paid to the production workers. The subsequent terms within the brackets capture the 85 percent
rule for short weeks and the required overtime premium. The last term is the unemployment compensation
6For further discussion of the institutional details of labor contracts in automobile manufacturing, see Bresnahan and
Ramey (1994), Hall (2000), or Ramey and Vine (2004).
18bill charged to the ﬁrm. Let Dt = 0 if and only if St = 0. Thus, the cost function is piecewise linear with
kinks at one shift running 40 hours per week and two shifts running 40 hours per week. This implies that
the ﬁrm will minimize average costs by operating the plant with either one shift or two shifts for 40 hours
per week.
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the present value of the discounted stream of proﬁts. For each

























subject to (1)-(6) and where c(D;S;hjq) is given by (7). The terms t(slast
t =ilast
t )y and t(sthis
t =ithis
t )y are
revenue taxes the automaker must pay if the sales-to-inventory ratio is large. This term captures the
distributional costs the automaker faces, as described previously in the introduction. When inventories are
low, it is harder for potential customers to observe and gauge a vehicle (that is, to test-drive it and view
the choice set), and thus it is more costly to consummate a sale. The tax effectively disappears when the
sales-to-inventory ratio is small.7 The termV(Ilast
T+1;0;1) is a continuation value, which we now deﬁne.
Let V(Ilast;Ithis;t) be the optimal value at week t for the ﬁrm that holds in inventory Ilast of last year’s
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for t = 1;:::;T ¡1 (9)
subject to (1), (2), and (6) and where c(D;S;hjq) is given by (7).













7We tried specifying demand as an increasing function of the level of inventories; that is, customers are willing to pay a
higher price if they are more likely to be matched to their ideal vehicle. However, in this case, the model has the counterfactual
implication that, all other things being equal, higher inventories are associated with higher prices. Fact 5 suggests that, even if
demand is increasing in inventories, the supply-side inventory effect dominates the demand-side effect. We also tried replacing
the revenue tax with an explicit inventory-to-sales target; this yields similar results, but the tax is computationally more robust.
192.2 Parameterizing the Model
There a number of parameters in this model. Our approach is to choose the supply-side parameters in the
ﬁrm’s problem based on the ﬁrst moments in the data and from published information on assembly plants.
For demand parameters, we employ a discrete-choice methodology to estimate consumer’s preferences
over automobiles. We then use these estimates to compute the intercepts, own-price semi-elasticities and
cross-price semi-elasticities that are parameters in the market demand function, equation (1).
2.2.1 Demand-side parameters
Overview: The demand for automobiles is modelled within a discrete-choice framework. Following
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), henceforth BLP, we construct the demand system by aggregating
over the discrete choices of heterogeneous individuals. The utility derived from choosing an automobile
depends on the interaction between a consumer’s characteristics and a product’s characteristics. Con-
sumers are heterogeneous in income as well as in their tastes for certain product characteristics. We
distinguish between two types of product characteristics: those that are observed by the econometrician
(such as horsepower and miles per gallon), which are denoted by X; and those that are unobserved by
the econometrician (such as styling or prestige), which are denoted by x. Drawing from the nested logit
literature, we also incorporate a correlation in the consumer’s tastes for vehicles of the same model year.
We divide vehicles into G+1 mutually exclusive groups (that is, model years)–g = 0;1;2;:::;G–where
the outside good is the sole member of group 0. We also allow households’ distaste for price, denoted by
a, to vary from quarter to quarter. This captures the possibility that different types of households show up
to purchase a new automobile at different times of the year. We specify the indirect utility derived from
consumer i purchasing product j, dropping the time subscript, as
uijq = Xjb+xj ¡aiqpj +å
k
sknikxjk+zig+(1¡r)eij; (11)
where pj denotes the price of product j and xjk 2 Xj is the kth observable characteristic of product j.
The term Xjb+xj, where b are parameters to be estimated, represents the utility from product j that is
common to all consumers, or a mean level of utility. Consumers then have a distribution of tastes for each
observable characteristic. For each characteristic k, consumer i has a taste nik, which is drawn from an
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal distribution. The parameter sk captures
the variance in consumer tastes. The term aiq measures a consumer’s distaste for price increases in quarter
q = f1;2;3;4g. Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999), we assume that aiq =
aq
yi , where aq is a
20parameter to be estimated and yi is a draw from the income distribution. We assume the distribution of
household income is lognormal, and, for each year in our sample, we estimate its mean and variance from
the Current Population Survey (CPS). The second-to-last term in equation (11) captures correlations in a
consumer’s tastes for products within the same group. For consumer i, the variable zig is common to all
products in group g and has a distribution that depends upon r. Finally, eij is an i.i.d. extreme value.
Consumers choose among the j = 1;2;:::;J automobiles in our sample and the outside good (denoted
j = 0), which represents the choice not to buy a new automobile from the Big Three. Consumers choose
the product j that maximizes utility, and market shares are obtained by aggregating over consumers.
Implementation: As described in section 1, our sample includes data for the Big Three ﬁrms over the
ﬁve-year period from February 1999 to January 2004. There are 638 observations of unique model and
model-year vehicles. We aggregate sales and prices to the quarterly frequency because there is a signiﬁcant
amount of volatility in monthly sales due, in part, to intertemporal substitution. Moreover, BLP’s static
utility maximization approach is better suited to analyzing quarterly data. We do not estimate the model at
an annual frequency because the variation in price and in the consumer’s choice set from quarter-to-quarter
is a signiﬁcant source of identiﬁcation in the BLP framework.
We use vehicle characteristics that include a set of model dummies, a measure of acceleration, vehicle
dimensions, a measure of safety, and fuel efﬁciency.8 As was done in previous research, we link quantity
sold and transaction price to the characteristics of the base model to produce a vehicle-quarter observation.
To this standard set of characteristics, we also add a measure of how long a product has been sold–the num-
ber of quarters since the vehicle was ﬁrst introduced. The model dummies, the number of quarters since
introduction, and a quadratic time trend make up the vector of observable characteristic used to compute
the mean utility of a product, Xjb. The measures of acceleration, dimension, safety, and fuel efﬁciency,
along with the number of quarters since introduction, are included in the vector of observable characteris-
tics used to measure heterogeneity in households’ preferences, åksknikxjk. In essence, the model dummies
help explain the mean utility level of a product, while the measures of acceleration, dimension, safety, fuel
efﬁciency, and number of quarters since introduction drive the substitution patterns among vehicles.
Unlike the approach taken in BLP, we also incorporate (through z) correlation in consumers’ tastes
across a discrete characteristic, model years. This nested logit approach is folded into the BLP algorithm
in the natural way. Following BLP, we use the number of households in the U.S. as reported in the CPS as
8Information on vehicle characteristics were taken from Automotive News’s Market Data Book (various years).
21a measure of market size for the year. We assume that one-fourth of all households in a given year show
up each quarter.
Our estimation strategy follows the generalized method of moments approach taken by BLP. Given
the vector of parameters q, we solve for the unique vector of mean utilities such that the model’s pre-
dicted market shares equal actual market shares.9 We then match the moments related to the market-level
disturbance, xj, using the assumption that x is uncorrelated with the vehicle characteristics, X, or
E[x(q)jX] = 0: (12)
As in the typical nested logit exercise, the parameter r is estimated through the decomposition of the mean
utility of a product,
dj = Xjb¡xj +rln(sj=g); (13)
where dj is equal to the difference between the market share of product j and the market share of the
outside good, and sj=g is the market share of product j relative to the market share of the group to which
product j belongs.
As x is correlated with both price and sj=g, an endogeneity problem arises. Berry (1994) provides a
methodology that allows us to use instrumental variables. We follow BLP’s approximation of the optimal
instruments, thoughinoursettingtheyhaveadiminishedeffect. Theseinstrumentsarebasedoncompeting
products’ characteristics, which change at the model-year frequency, though our price and quantity data
vary at the quarterly level. Accordingly, we augment the set of instruments to include indicator variables
for whether multiple vintages of a model are being sold simultaneously. Whether or not another vintage is
being sold at the same time has an effect on price, and this effect can vary at a quarterly frequency. Further,
there is little reason to suspect that the sale of multiple vintages of a model is related to the unobserved
characteristic of a vehicle. New vintages are most often introduced at an annual frequency, and automakers
face large costs to altering the scheduled introduction of a new vintage.
Results: We present a subset of the parameter estimates in table 6. Given their large number, we do
not report our ﬁxed-effects estimates. Instead, we show those estimates that measure the heterogeneity
in consumers’ tastes (s) along with estimates of the substitutability of vehicles across model years (r)
and estimates of a consumer’s distaste for price (a). The coefﬁcients on miles per dollar (measure of
9We modiﬁed the programs provided in Nevo (2000) to estimate the demand system. A notable addition to this set of programs
is the importance sampling simulator described in BLP, which is used to integrate over n to obtain a prediction of market share.
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Air bag 0.93 0.631
Intro -0.04 0.154
Model-Year Nest r 0.58 0.014
Distaste for Price (Q1) a1 42.31 7.684
Distaste for Price (Q2) a2 36.64 7.998
Distaste for Price (Q3) a3 34.99 6.823
Distaste for Price (Q4) a4 32.95 4.707
Table 6: Parameter Estimates
fuel efﬁciency), air bag (measure of safety), and intro (number of quarters since introduction) are not
statistically signiﬁcant. However, we estimate that consumers are quite heterogeneous in their tastes for
acceleration (horsepower over weight), height, and size (length times width of the vehicle).
The model-year nest and the price coefﬁcients are precisely estimated. The estimate of r reﬂects the
substitutability of models from different model years, where r = 0 indicates no substitutability and r = 1
implies perfect substitutability. Our estimate of r is 0.58, which suggests that consumers do not ﬁnd
vehicles from different model years to be close substitutes. The estimated value of household’s distaste
for price falls from quarter 1 to quarter 4. The quarters differ from calendar quarters. We deﬁned the ﬁrst
quarter as the ﬁrst three months of a typical vehicle’s product cycle: August, September, and October. We
then deﬁned the second through fourth quarters on the basis of this new grouping of months. Although
the differences among the a’s are not signiﬁcant, they imply that households are more sensitive to price in
quarters when automakers typically offer multiple vintages of vehicles, relative to quarters when only one
vintage is available.
The estimate of r and the magnitude of the price coefﬁcients are more easily interpreted by examining
the implied own-price and cross-price elasticities. These elasticities provide the clearest picture of the
values of the semi-elasticities that we use in our speciﬁed demand function. We report the own-price elas-
ticities of individual vehicles averaged across market segments, quarters, and vintages, where the vintage
label signiﬁes whether the vehicle is the newest model year available or not (table 7).
23Vintage Market Segment 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
New Compact 8.2 9.2 7.9 8.6
Full 10.3 11.3 9.1 9.6
Luxury 9.8 11.4 8.4 9.0
Midsize 9.4 10.5 8.9 9.7
Pickup 9.7 10.8 9.1 9.0
SUV 9.7 10.7 8.6 8.6
Sporty 10.8 10.9 9.1 10.0
Van 10.2 11.6 9.7 10.1
All 9.8 10.8 8.8 9.3
Old Compact 7.8 8.3 8.8 8.8
Full 10.0 11.4 10.5 10.6
Luxury 9.9 11.0 9.2 9.2
Midsize 9.4 10.0 8.9 8.1
Pickup 9.8 10.8 8.9 11.6
SUV 9.9 10.8 9.6 8.6
Sporty 9.8 11.7 9.3 8.6
Van 10.2 10.9 9.6 5.8
All 9.6 10.6 9.3 8.9
Table 7: The Absolute Value of Own-Price Elasticities by Market Segment, Quarter, and Vintage
The own-price elasticities generated by our parameter estimates range between 6 and 12, an indication
that manufacturers face quite elastic demand. In the ﬁrst quarter a car is sold, our results imply that a 1
percent price increase for a typical compact car (roughly $140) causes an 8.2 percent fall in sales, holding
everything else equal. The average own-price elasticity across all vehicles is reported in the “All” row,
and illustrates that elasticities in the ﬁrst and second quarter are typically higher than those in the third and
fourth quarter for both new and old vintages. This is likely driven by the highera’s and largerchoice sets in
these quarters. In general, our estimated elasticities are higher than those found in the previous literature;
BLP, for example, report a range of elasticities between 3 and 6. It is not surprising, however, that our
elasticity estimates are higher than some observed elsewhere because previous research estimated own-
price elasticities among models–that is, at a level of aggregation higher than that of our data. Indeed, when
we re-estimate the parameters from data aggregated to the model level, the implied own-price elasticities
fall within the range of those reported in BLP.
Given that automakers sell two vintages of the same model simultaneously for almost half of the model
year, the cross-price elasticity between vintages of the same model is of particular interest to the ﬁrm. We
24Vintage Market Segment 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
New to Old Compact 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04
Full 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03
Luxury 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Midsize 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Pickup 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.12
SUV 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04
Sporty 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Van 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Old to New Compact 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01
Full 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
Luxury 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Midsize 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Pickup 0.06 0.18 0.02 0.05
SUV 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
Sporty 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00
Van 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01
Notes: “New to Old” indicates the percentage change in the market share of the newer vintage of a model given
a percentage change in the price of the older vintage. “Old to New” indicates the opposite relationship.
Table 8: Cross-Price Elasticities Between Vintages of the Same Model by Market Segment and Quarter
report our estimates of the cross-price elasticities between two vintages of the same model, averaged over
quarters and across market segments (table 8).
For most of the vehicles in our sample, the old and new vintages of the same model are sold simulta-
neously during the ﬁrst and second quarters (August through January). However, a fair number of vehicles
are introduced at other times in the year, and so we can compute cross-price elasticities throughout the
year. The upper portion of table 8 displays the percentage change in the market share of the newer vin-
tage of a model given a percentage change in the price of the older vintage. The bottom portion of the
table shows the opposite relationship–the percentage change in market share for the old vintage given a
percentage change in the price of the newer vintage. Generally, the estimated cross-price elasticities are
quite small relative to the own-price elasticities. This implies that various vintages of the same model are
typically quite imperfect substitutes.10
To check the robustness of these results, we estimated several different speciﬁcations of the consumer’s
10Ana Aizcorbe suggested that geographical factors may explain our low cross-price elasticity estimates. If different vintages
of the same model are rarely offered for sale at the same location, then the degree to which consumers can substitute between
vintages may be limited.
25utility function. We rejected a speciﬁcation of utility for which groups are deﬁned at the model level (that
is, the correlation in consumer tastes is across all available vintages of a particular model) because r was
estimated to be greater than 1.11 In addition, both the high own-price and the small cross-price estimated
elasticities are consistent across several different utility speciﬁcations.12
2.2.2 Supply-side parameters
For the parameters in the ﬁrm’s problem, we set T, the number of weeks in a model year, to 52 and
the time-invariant interest rate such that (1+r)¡52 = 0:95. The interest rate is the only cost of holding
inventories in the model. To parameterize the cost function, we set the line speed, workers per shift, and
wage rates to values typically observed at assembly plants. We set the remaining three parameters, g, t
and y to match the average retail price, average rate of production, and average days-supply of inventories
observed in the data. Although we would have preferred to estimate these parameters econometrically,
computational issues made such estimation infeasible. The line speed at most North American assembly
plants is set between 40 and 60 cars per hour; thus, we ﬁx the line speed to 50 cars per hour. Using the
employment data from Hall (2000), we set n to 1300 workers per shift, so the ﬁrm employs 2600 workers.
We read the wages off the union contract: w1 = $27.00 per hour, and w2 = $28.35 per hour. We set g, the
per vehicle cost, to the average retail price observed minus $1500; g effectively scales the cost function
linearly, and thus we allow g to differ across market segments. We set the revenue tax parameters t to 1
and y to 1.75 such that we match the average days-supply of inventories observed in the data.
2.3 Model Results
Using these parameter values, we solve the dynamic program given by (9) and (10) via an algorithm































11To be consistent with the hypothesis of random utility maximization, it must be that r 2 [0;1].
12In general, we were unable to estimate alternate utility speciﬁcations that had more parameters than did the speciﬁcation
described in the paper (such as random coefﬁcients on a set of model dummies). These alternative speciﬁcations demanded too
much of the data.
26Market Data t = 1 t = 0
Segment Product Price D-S Product Price D-S Product Price D-S
Compact 14,524 $13,622 73 16,208 $13,594 70 16,000 $13,642 12
Midsize 10,886 19,193 60 12,000 19,273 75 16,333 19,075 11
Fullsize 7,184 23,772 75 6,167 24,107 77 9,833 23,708 13
Luxury 3,106 36,032 80 2,167 36,430 80 2,479 36,765 9
Pickup 35,114 23,662 84 17,812 24,121 67 22,900 24,224 9
SUV 11,532 28,660 75 9,117 29,140 74 14,500 28,741 11
Sporty 5,721 27,227 83 3,167 27,331 82 6,500 27,081 21
Van 8,396 22,716 85 9,667 22,868 80 13,667 22,581 10
Average 76 76 12
Table 9: Average Monthly Production, Retail Prices, and Days-Supply by Market Segment
To solve for the ﬁxed point, we carried out the following steps: (1) Guess an initial value forV(Ilast;0;1);
(2) solve the T Bellman equations in (9) and (10) through backward recursions; (3) compute a new value
forV(Ilast;0;1) through policy iteration; and (4) repeat steps 2 and 3 until a ﬁxed point is reached.
Because of the non-convexities in the cost function, we solve for both the optimal level of output and
the cost minimizing production schedule through grid search. We allow weekly production, q, to take on
values between 0 and 6000 in increments of 50. The grids for Dt and St are set from 1 to 6 and from 0 to
2, respectively, in increments of 1. The plant is closed for the week whenever St = 0. The shift length, ht,
can take on values of 7, 8, 9 or 10. So there are up to 72 feasible production schedules to evaluate for each
121 possible levels of production.
We discretize each inventory grid into 26 points from 0 to 60,000. The distance between grid points
increases with the level of inventories. Thus, the grid points are more densely spaced in the region where
the value function has more curvature. For each of the 676 inventory pairs, we maximize the right hand
side of equations (9) and (10) over each sales price and level of output. Points off the two inventory
grids are approximated using bi-linear interpolation. The two sales prices, plast and pthis, may take on any
positive value such that quantity demanded remains positive. Finally, we impose only mild seasonality on
production, assumingthat the plantcloses fortwoweeks inJuly (weeks51 and52) for amodel changeover.
In table 9 we report the average monthly rate of production, retail price, and days-supply of inventories
for a typical vehicle in each market segment. We then report the corresponding averages implied by the
model for the case with the revenue tax (t = 1) and the case without the revenue tax (t = 0). In general,
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Figure 11: Week 27 Shadow Value of Inventories
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be terribly surprising because, given the estimated demand curves, the parameter, g, was set to match
these moments.13 With the revenue tax, the model matches the average observed day-supply. Without
the revenue tax, however, the average level of inventories are 1=6 the level observed in the data. As is
well-understood in the inventory literature, it is difﬁcult to match the high level of inventories observed in
many industries without an ad hoc inventory-to-sales target in the ﬁrm’s objective function.
To illustrate the dynamics of the model, we ﬁrst consider the ﬁrm’s pricing decision for a typical
midsize car setting t = 1. Later we report results for which we shut down the revenue tax by setting t = 0.
In ﬁgure 11, we plot the partial derivative of the value function for week 27 with respect to inventories of
the current model year (other weeks are qualitatively similar). This ﬁgure illustrates the shadow value of
inventories, or marginal increase in the ﬁrm’s net worth from an additional unit of inventory, at each point
in the state space for week 27. The shadow value of inventories is a decreasing function of the level of
inventories. When the level of inventory for this year’s model is close to zero, an additional vehicle of this
year’s model is worth $18,600 to the ﬁrm; however, at the upper bound of the inventory grid, the shadow
value of an additional vehicle from this model year is worth only about $17,960 to the ﬁrm–roughly the
average cost of producing a vehicle when the plant operates two forty-hour shifts per week. Given the
non-convexities in the cost function, computing and reporting the marginal cost of an additional vehicle is
bit more involved, but the value for g (the material cost per vehicle) of $17,693 ($19,193-$1,500) provides
a lower bound on the marginal cost.
13The model has difﬁculty matching the quantities of pickup trucks. While we assume each vehicle is made at a single plant,
several popular pickup trucks (e.g. Ford F-series, Chevy Silverado, and Dodge Ram) are produced at four or ﬁve plants.
28Because the automaker faces a downward-sloping demand curve, the proﬁt-maximizing price sets
marginal revenue equal to the shadow value of inventories next period. If we set the cross-price semi-
















where V2 denotes the derivative of the value function with respect to the second argument. This is the
standard condition for monopoly pricing, but in this case marginal cost is the shadow value of an additional
unit of inventory next period.
We then plot the pricing rule for this year’s vintage for week 26 in ﬁgure 12. The pricing rule is almost
the shape of the shadow value of inventories. Holding all other things constant, the optimal price is a
decreasing function of the level of inventory—our ﬁfth fact. In ﬁgure 13, we plot slices of the pricing rules
for different weeks in the product cycle, holding the inventory of the competing vintage ﬁxed. Prices are
a decreasing function of the level of inventory and the pricing curve shifts down over time. These price
rules are consistent with the ﬁndings of Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2003) that the average
retail price at a dealership with ample inventory is about $230 per car less than that at a dealership with low
inventory. These pricing rules do not guarantee that prices fall over the product cycle; after week 52, for
example, inventories are monotonically decreasing over time (since there is no replenishment), therefore
prices may go up or down depending on the evolution of inventories.
In ﬁgures 14-17, we plot a simulation from the model for ﬁve 52-week model years, time-aggregated
to a monthly frequency. Because the model is deterministic, each of these simulations is identical. These
graphs are designed to be analogous to ﬁgures presented in section 1; however note that ﬁgures 1-4 are for
a particular midsize car while we parameterize the model for an average midsize car.
The implied time series from the model are consistent with the ﬁve facts put forth in the introduction.
As these ﬁgures illustrate, the model generates both downward sloping price paths and hump-shaped in-
ventory and sales. The revenue tax term plays a key role in this. Early on in the model year, inventories
are naturally low, so it is expensive to sell a lot of vehicles. In order to reduce this tax in the future, the
automaker needs to build up inventories. Hence the automaker sets prices high early on in the year to
dampen down sales and allow inventories to accumulate. Once inventories are high (inventories peak in
the seven month of the model year), the tax effectively disappears and the ﬁrm lowers prices in order to
stimulate sales. Further exacerbating the fall in prices, demand for the vehicle starts to decrease as the
model year progresses. For forty-one weeks (about three-quarters of the year) the automaker sell both















































Figure 13: Optimal Price Rule Over the Product Cycle, Holding the Inventory Level of the Competing
Vintage Fixed.
vintages simultaneously and prices fall from $20,061 to $17,470: a drop of 12.9 percent over the product
cycle or an average monthly price decline of 8.4 percent at an annual rate. This results in a new vintage
premium of 8.1 percent, which is within a single standard error of the 8.5 percent new vintage premium
for a typical midsize car, as reported in tables 2 and 10.
More generally, as reported in table 10, the model with t set to 1 is able to match the observed price
declines and vintage premia for all market segments. For seven of the eight market segments, the implied
price declines are within a single standard error of the average declines seen in the data; and the remaining
market segment (luxury cars) is well within the two-standard error band. The model underestimates the
average vintage premia by nine-tenths of a percent (8.8 versus 7.9). While this is outside the two-standard
error band, the model gets the magnitude right. We believe that relaxing our assumption that new vintages
arrive strictly every 52 weeks would enable the model to better match this moment.
For most of the year in the midsize car case, the automaker produces 4000 vehicles per week running
two eight-hour shifts for ﬁve days per week. For the last two months of the model year, the plant runs just
a single shift before shutting down and changing vintages. Comparing ﬁgures 3 and 7 to ﬁgure 16, it is
clear the model predicts production to be quite smooth relative to what is observed in the data. At most









































Figure 14: Monthly Prices.













































Figure 15: Monthly Sales.


















































Figure 16: Monthly Production.

















































Figure 17: Monthly Inventories.
Simulated Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories for a Typical Midsize Car By Model Year: t=1.
31Data t = 1 t = 0
Market Price Vintage Price Vintage Price Vintage
Segment Decline Premium Decline Premium Decline Premium
Compact 9.5 (2.4) 7.1 (0.5) 10.0 9.3 4.6 5.0
Midsize 9.2 (1.5) 8.5 (0.4) 8.4 8.1 3.1 4.3
Fullsize 8.9 (2.1) 8.3 (0.6) 7.1 6.4 2.2 4.1
Luxury 11.6 (1.2) 11.6 (0.4) 10.1 10.7 5.1 5.7
Pickup 9.9 (2.2) 10.6 (0.7) 9.5 9.1 5.3 6.1
SUV 8.2 (0.9) 7.2 (0.4) 7.4 6.9 3.4 4.3
Sporty 5.1 (2.4) 7.2 (0.8) 4.3 4.1 1.7 2.8
Van 9.6 (1.4) 8.6 (0.4) 8.3 8.7 4.3 5.2
Average 9.2 (0.6) 8.8 (0.2) 8.1 7.9 3.7 4.7
Note: The percentage price declines are at annual rates. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
Table 10: Average Price Declines and Vintage Premia (in percent)
assembly plants, production during the ﬁrst several weeks of the model year is typically below average as
the plant “ramps up” output; further throughout the year, plants regularly close for holidays and in response
to both supply and demand shocks. While these features can be easily incorporated into the model and
would increase the volatility of production, they obscure the intuition of the model.
The model simulation can also be viewed in price-quantity space. In ﬁgure 18 we plot the time path
of the quantity-price pairs over a single model year for a typical midsize car. The stars denote the weekly
realizations from a single simulation from the model. The crosses denote the average observations from
the data for the midsize sector. These quantity-price pairs are interpolated from monthly observations
to obtain weekly points. As the ﬁgure illustrates, prices fall over the model year while sales initially
start small, grow, and then decrease. Any model with a stable supply or demand curve will be unable
to match the price and sales patterns in the data; however, the current model successfully replicates the
basic horseshoe pattern. For the ﬁrst half of the model year, demand is relatively stable while the marginal
revenue curve rotates counter-clockwise toward the demand curve as the ﬁrm accumulates inventories and
reduces the revenue tax. The shadow value of inventories (i.e. the supply curve) also shifts right. This
generates decreasing prices and increasing sales. After about 30 weeks, the demand curve starts to shift to
the left and continues falling for the remainder of the model year. This causes both prices and sales to fall
during the second half of the product cycle.
To isolate the role inventory policy has on the optimal price paths, we resolve the model removing








































Figure 18: Weekly (quantity,price) pairs over the model year. The stars are realization from one simulation
from the model. The blue stars denote this year’s model. The green stars denote last year’s model. The
red crosses (this year’s model) and purple crosses (last year’s model) are the observations in the data.
the revenue tax (i.e. setting t = 0). This simulation can be interpreted as allowing the ﬁrm to engage in
a build-to-order rather than a build-to-stock inventory policy. In ﬁgures 19-22 we plot the price, sales,
production, and inventory pathes under a build-to-order policy while still allowing for multiple vintages.
To ease comparison, we set the scales of the ﬁgures consistent with those in ﬁgures 14-17. Under a build-
to-order policy, the ﬁrm sets a downward sloping price path that is far less dramatic than the price path
with the revenue tax. Prices fall only $838 (from $19,369 to $18,531) or 4.3 percent (3.1 percent at an
annual rate) over the product cycle. For the ﬁrst 40 weeks the ﬁrm essentially builds to order, producing
and selling roughly 4000 cars per week (corresponding to operating two 40 hours shifts). As the ﬁrm nears
the 52nd week, the ﬁrm moderates the price declines to dampen sales and accumulates modest inventories
to carry over into the next model year. The ﬁrm then sells last year’s vintage for only fourteen weeks
into the following model year with an average vintage premium of 4.3 percent. Hence a model with
just declining demand yields within-product-cycle price declines and vintage premia that are half of the
declines generated by a model with a build-to-stock inventory motive. Furthermore, under the build-to-
order policy neither sales nor inventories have the pronounced hump-shaped pattern seen in the data.









































Figure 19: Monthly Prices.













































Figure 20: Monthly Sales.


















































Figure 21: Monthly Production.

















































Figure 22: Monthly Inventories.
Simulated Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories for a Typical Midsize Car By Model Year: t=0.
34These patterns hold across the other market segments as well. As can be seen in table 10, under the
build-to-order policy the average price decline is only 3.7. This is less than half of the average price
decline implied by the build-to-stock models (8.1) or seen in the data (9.2). Furthermore the implied
vintage premia with t = 0 is only 60 percent on average of the vintage premia with t = 1 (4.7 versus 7.9).
While it is certainly the case that the demand for a particular vintage of new vehicle falls over the model
year, this alone explains about half of the price decline in automobiles and misses salient comovements
among prices, sales and inventories.
3 Conclusion
Wehavedocumentedasetofstylizedfactsforthewithin-model-yearpricingandsalesofnewautomobiles.
Prices decline steadily over the model year while sales and inventories are hump-shaped. It is not the case
that prices only fall during the overlap period between vintages when dealers shout over the radio “We are
slashing prices to make room for the new model year!” To understand these facts we formulate and solve a
market equilibrium model for a single vehicle line. While falling demand over the product cycle explains
about one half these price declines, our model suggests that the other half of these declines is driven by
build-to-stock inventory management.
Advances in production and information technology have made it easier to implement build-to-order
policies. For example, the computer maker Dell, has been successful in selling built-to-order computers.
It is our understanding from discussions with industry executives that the automakers would like to move
toward an inventory policy in which a larger fraction of consumers order their new vehicles rather than
buy whatever is on the dealer’s lot. Our analysis suggests that enacting such a policy will dampen within-
model-year price declines and reduce the period in which consecutive vintages compete with each other.
Finally we view this paper as part of a larger research agenda to understand how ﬁrms adjust prices and
production when faced with demand shocks. While the analysis presented above is entirely deterministic,
in future work we plan to add persistent demand shocks and a richer cost structure to the model. We
can then ask whether a negative demand shock will result in lower prices (e.g. rebates or other ﬁnancial
incentives) or in shutting down the plant. Given the important non-convexities in production scheduling at
automobileassembly, itmaybeoptimalattimestocutpricestokeeptheplantsrunningwhileatothertimes
it may be optimal to shut plants down for an “inventory adjustment”. Ultimately, we want to understand
the shape of the supply curve for new vehicles and how it varies over the model year.
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